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This paper considers two objections which can be levelled against Leibniz’s 
account of divine love. The first is that he cannot allow that divine love is gra-
cious because he is committed to the view that love is properly proportioned 
to the perfection perceived in the beloved; the second is that God is cruel to 
those who are damned and so cannot be said to love all. I argue that Leibniz 
has the resources to rebut—or at least blunt—each of these objections.
Leibniz is committed to the view that properties can be attributed to God 
and to human beings univocally; he also takes it for granted that the prop-
erty “(perfectly) loving” can be attributed to God. Notable discussions of 
love in his writings from the 1670s are situated in a broader investigation 
into the nature of justice; in these early writings, the just person is defined 
as one who loves all, with love generally being defined as delight in the 
happiness of another. In the Confessio philosophi (1672–1673) this scheme 
is explicitly related to God: both speakers in the dialogue agree that God 
is (perfectly) just, and that this entails that God loves all, i.e., that God is 
delighted by the happiness of all (CP 29–33). I will start section I with an 
outline of Leibniz’s general account of love, before turning to the particu-
lar case of God’s love for human beings. With this background in place, 
I consider two objections which can be levelled against Leibniz’s account 
of divine love. The first is that his suggestion that love is properly propor-
tioned to the perfection perceived in the beloved is inconsistent with the 
view that divine love is gracious; the second is that God is cruel to those 
who are damned and so cannot be said to love all. These objections are 
discussed in sections II and III respectively. I conclude that Leibniz has the 
resources to meet each objection. The fourth and final section addresses 
the question of whether Leibniz should do more to pre-empt these two 
objections. I suggest that his reticence should not be judged too harshly, 
as it can plausibly be ascribed to his commitment to promoting Amor Dei 
super omnia—the love for God above all things which he takes to constitute 
our greatest possible happiness.
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I. Divine Love
Leibniz’s account of divine love1 must be understood in the context of 
his general account of love, which in turn must be seen in the light of his 
characterisation of the just person [justus]. First, we should recall that from 
his youth, Leibniz espouses the view that acting justly is consistent with 
acting out of self-interest. Indeed, in an important early text, the Elementa 
juris naturalis [henceforth: EJN2], he endorses the stronger claim that being 
motivated by self-interest is a necessary condition of an act’s being just.3 
However, Leibniz is also committed to the view that the just person is 
loving, and that (genuine) love entails willing the good of the beloved 
for its own sake. He recognises that these two fundamental commitments 
appear to be mutually inconsistent. But he maintains that once we accept 
his own definition of love, we can see that the difficulty is merely prima 
facie. The definition is as follows: To love is to be delighted by the happi-
ness of another person.4 As Leibniz sees things, to delight in the happiness 
of another person is to value their happiness as an end in itself, and this is 
sufficient for “genuine” or “disinterested” love. The definition which has 
just been cited is first introduced in EJN, and in this context it is clearly 
intended to serve as a kind of shorthand for a rather subtle account of 
the loving person [amans]. The crucial point for present purposes is that 
Leibniz does not think that love demands an occurrent delight in the hap-
piness of another, as a face-value reading of the definition might suggest. 
He certainly seems to think that the paradigm case of love involves pre-
cisely such an occurrent delight. But he also clearly indicates that those 
who are not happy can nonetheless be loved, because willing to bring 
about some good for such persons—i.e., to contribute to their happiness—
is sufficient for love.5
It should now be clear that on Leibniz’s account, to say that God loves 
all is to say that God delights in each person’s happiness, taking this defi-
nition in the broad sense outlined above. To gain further insight into the 
nature of divine love, we must address the question of God’s motivation 
1For the purposes of this paper, “divine love” refers to God’s love for all human beings. 
Leibniz himself often uses “divinus amor” or “amour de Dieu” to refer to our love for God.
2There are 6 drafts of EJN. Where “EJN” is followed by a number, it refers to a particular 
draft, as numbered in the Akademie edition. Where no number is given, “EJN” refers to the 
set of six drafts as a whole.
3See EJN.5 (A VI.i.473). This draft was probably written in 1671.
4See, for example, A VI.i.461; CP 28; A VI.iv.1357; A VI.iv.2892; A VI.xvi.602. Leibniz’s 
attempts to solve the problem in question are discussed in Brown, “Disinterested Love: 
Understanding Leibniz’s Reconciliation of Self- and Other-Regarding Motives,” and 
Goldenbaum, “It’s Love! Leibniz’s Foundation of Natural Law as the Outcome of his Struggle 
with Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s Naturalism.” For a detailed treatment of Leibniz’s engagement 
with the “pure love” controversies of the 1680s and 1690s, see Naert, Leibniz et la querelle du 
pur amour.
5See EJN.5, A VI.i.479. Cf. A VI.iv.2793.
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for creating human beings. In the Aphorisms concerning happiness, wisdom, 
charity, justice (1678/79), Leibniz asserts:
God’s aim or goal is his own gladness [laetitia] or love for Himself.
God created creatures—and above all those endowed with a mind—for the 
sake of His glory, or out of love for Himself. (A VI.iv.2804)
Further detail on the connection between the creation of rational beings 
and God’s glory can be found in an earlier text, EJN.2:
[W]e all seek glory [laus]. And there is no wise person who does not seek 
it, since they seek harmony. Glory is a reflection and duplication of har-
mony, a certain echo of it, as it were. If God did not have rational creatures 
in the world, he would have the same harmony, only with no echo, the same 
beauty but with no reflection and refraction or multiplication. Hence the 
wisdom of God demanded rational creatures, in which things multiplied 
themselves (A VI.i.438).6
Both the emphasis on wisdom and on harmony are significant. In 
Leibniz’s scheme, God is morally necessitated by His perfect wisdom to 
actualise the best, or most harmonious possible world.7 Rational crea-
tures are an indispensable element of this world because they “echo” or 
“reflect” its harmony, thereby “multiplying” it, and thus glorifying God.8 
In his later writings, Leibniz captures this feature of rational creatures 
by characterising them as “living mirrors”—living because their cogni-
tive capacity allows them to apprehend the underlying harmony of our 
world.9 Ultimately, then, the creation of human beings must be explained 
by reference to God’s wisdom. Thanks to His perfect wisdom, God both 
seeks glory, and also knows that this glory is best served by the creation 
of rational beings.
 We must also recall Leibniz’s commitment to two claims relating to the 
best possible world, or “universal harmony,” which God in His perfect 
wisdom wills to actualize. First, Leibniz consistently espouses a thorough-
going determinism: he thus holds that both the degree and the kinds of 
divine grace which are bestowed on any given human being, and which 
can be said to be a concrete expression of divine love for that individual, 
are determined. Second, Leibniz is committed to a denial of transworld 
identity: he holds that each inhabitant of a possible world can be a mem-
ber only of that particular world.10 As we shall see, Leibniz’s endorsement 
6Cf. A IV.i.532. The suggestion that God would have “the same harmony” even if He did 
not bring any creatures into existence raises the spectre of monism. For a rich discussion of 
Leibniz’s general vulnerability to the charge of monism, see Newlands, “From Theism to 
Idealism to Monism: A Leibnizian Road Not Taken.”
7Cf. Tdp 2/ GP VI.50; T 128/ GP VI.181. Leibniz’s understanding of “moral necessity” is 
elucidated in Adams, “Moral Necessity.”
8Leibniz’s conception of “the glory of God” is discussed in Rateau, La question du mal chez 
Leibniz, 304–305.
9See, for example, Monadology §83/ AG 223. Leibniz’s use of this term is traced in 
Nachtomy, Living Mirrors, 137.
10See Adams, Leibniz, ch. 4; Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, ch. 4.
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of these two claims exacerbates his vulnerability to the charge which will 
be discussed in section III; namely, that he presents us with a God who is 
cruel. For now, though, I turn to the objection that Leibniz cannot accom-
modate the view that divine love is gracious.
II. Is Divine Love Gracious?
In asking whether Leibniz allows that divine love is gracious, I am using 
“grace” in the sense articulated by Robert Adams in chapter 6 of Finite and 
Infinite Goods:
[G]race is love that is not completely explained by the excellence of its object. 
Within certain wide parameters, at any rate, it is not proportioned to the 
excellence of its object, nor conditioned on the degree of that excellence. To 
the extent that that degree can be measured, grace typically outruns it.11
As Adams notes, grace is an attribute of divine love in all the main theis-
tic religions: they all hold that “God is merciful, compassionate . . . [and] 
forgives sin, not because that’s God’s job, as the famous cynical remark 
would have it, and not because sinners deserve it, but out of free and gra-
cious love.”12 Importantly, Adams denies that graciousness can be attrib-
uted only to divine love. He argues that “grace is rooted in the nature of 
love as such, and that any attitude toward a person that is not gracious in 
certain ways falls short of the ideal of love, and may thereby fail to be real 
love at all.”13 To support this claim, he presents us with a case involving an 
avowedly loving human parent:
Suppose a parent said, “Diane and Daniel are great people and very happy; 
they’ve been wonderful children to me, and I  love them very much; but 
I’d rather I’d had somewhat better and happier children instead of them,” 
we would be puzzled, because there is a glaring contradiction between the 
love professed and the preference stated . . . This example is interesting, in 
the first place, because it shows a point at which we think love should have 
some of the character of grace, inasmuch as its preferences should not be 
calibrated in accordance with objective value.14
Given that grace is rooted in the nature of love as such, we might naturally 
hope that Leibniz’s account can accommodate the view that divine love is 
gracious—a view which, after all, is upheld by the mainstream Christian 
tradition. On the face of it, however, it seems that Leibniz must deny this. 
To see why, it will be helpful to consider passages from two texts relating 
not to God’s love for us, but to Amor Dei super omnia, or our love for God 
(above all things):
God being the most perfect and the happiest substance—and consequently 
the most lovable—and pure, genuine love consisting in the state which 
11Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 151.
12Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 150.
13Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 151.
14Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 157.
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makes us take pleasure in the perfections and in the happiness of the one we 
love, this love must give us the greatest pleasure of which we are capable 
when God is its object (Principles of Nature and of Grace, 1714, §16, AG 212/
GP VI 605).
Love for God [divinus amor] surpasses other loves, because God can be loved 
with the most success [cum maximo successu], since at the same time noth-
ing is happier than God, and nothing more beautiful and more worthy of 
happiness can be apprehended [intelligi]. (Preface to the Codex juris gentium 
diplomaticus, 1693, A.IV.v.61)
Leibniz’s earlier writings suggest that Amor Dei super omnia is not a spe-
cial case, but that love in general is properly proportioned to the degree 
of perfection perceived in the beloved. In his earliest and most extensive 
discussions of the nature of love, in EJN, he asserts: “Although it is char-
acteristic of the just or good person to love everyone, love nonetheless has 
its degrees” (A VI.i.481). This suggestion is developed in a couple of pieces 
from the 1680s:
[O]ne who is wise will love everyone, but the more the traces of divine vir-
tue shine forth in somebody . . . the more she will love them (A VI.iv.2863).
Other things being equal, the more a person excels in perfection of the mind, 
or in true virtue, the more we will love them (A VI.iv.2891).
Taken together, these passages indicate that Leibniz is committed to what 
I shall call the “proportionment thesis”—the claim that love is properly 
proportioned to the excellence or perfection perceived in the beloved.15 
The crucial question for our purposes is whether Leibniz takes the pro-
portionment thesis to extend to divine love. The following assertion in 
the final draft of the Aphorisms concerning happiness, wisdom, charity, justice 
seems to suggest that he does:
God loves rational beings [mentes] in proportion to the perfection which He 
has given each of them. (A VI.iv.2804)16
In light of this assertion, must we accept that on Leibniz’s account, divine 
love is not gracious? At the outset it should be emphasised that Leibniz 
himself would no doubt object that he takes grace to be central to divine 
love. He insists that all the goods which we enjoy—notably the goods 
which are conducive to our happiness, and which can thus be seen as con-
crete manifestations of God’s love for us—fall under the heading “grace.”17 
15It is worth noting the parallel with Malebranche. See Grua, Jurisprudence universelle, 
192–194.
16In the earlier (second) draft, Leibniz writes: “Deus amat unumquemque proportione 
suae perfectionis [. . .] Deus amat mentes pro gradu perfectionis quam cuique earum dedit” 
(A VI.iv.2799). He prepared a German translation of the Aphorismi; the sentence from the final 
Latin draft cited above is translated “Gott liebet die verständigen Creaturen nach maße der 
Vollkommenheit so er jeden geben” (A VI.iv.2807). Cf. A VI.iv.583.
17Leibniz espouses a broad construal of grace. In an early piece, Von der Allmacht und 
Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen (1670–1671), such things as “advantageous 
opportunities,” “sensible parents,” and “diligent teachers” are all described as “grace” 
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Furthermore, Leibniz holds that “sufficient grace,” i.e., grace which is suf-
ficient for our eternal happiness, or salvation, is given to all.18 He could 
thus be said to uphold the view that divine love is a form, or expression, of 
grace. But whatever the merits of Leibniz’s own construal of grace, in the 
present context that construal is of only peripheral concern; as I have indi-
cated, Leibniz’s account of divine love is being assessed in relation to the 
sense of “grace” articulated by Adams. The crucial point is that on this lat-
ter construal, love cannot properly be proportioned to the excellence of the 
beloved. But we must now examine Adams’s account a little more closely.
First, we should note that Adams is not claiming that divine love is 
completely arbitrary. Given Leibniz’s vehement opposition to any sugges-
tion that God acts arbitrarily,19 it would hardly be fair to expect Leibniz 
to accept such a conception of grace. Adams holds that the excellence of 
created persons is constituted by their resemblance to God, and he takes 
it that this excellence gives God (defeasible) reasons to love them.20 To this 
extent, he implies that there is some proportionment involved in divine 
love. What Adams insists on—to return to the passage cited at the start of 
this section—is that (divine) love “is not completely explained by the excel-
lence of its object”; that grace “outruns” this excellence [emphasis mine]. 
He thus rules out only strict proportionment.
The crucial question, then, is whether Leibniz holds that God’s love is 
strictly proportioned to our excellence or perfection. With this question 
in mind, we can return to the texts I cited earlier in support of the claim 
that Leibniz is committed to the proportionment thesis. Let us start with 
the texts relating to Amor Dei super omnia. First, it is worth noting that the 
passages in question clearly point towards Leibniz’s conception of God 
as Ens perfectissimum, a being of unlimited perfection(s),21 but that there is 
no suggestion that our love for God should therefore be proportioned in 
such a way that it is infinitely greater than our love for our fellow human 
beings. Similarly, the assertion in the Aphorisms that “God loves rational 
beings in proportion to the perfection which He has given each of them” 
need not be taken to imply strict proportionment: it could simply be read 
as the claim that God’s love for us is properly grounded.22
[Gnade] (CP 17). Cf. A  IV.ix.629. Leibniz’s account of grace is discussed in Echavarria, 
“Leibniz on the Efficacy and Economy of Divine Grace.”
18Cf. A VI.iv.2369; A IV.ix.668.
19See CP 33; A IV.ix.635; GP VI.36/H 60; GP VI.219–220/H 237. For an insightful discus-
sion of Leibniz’s position, and key texts, see Riley, “Leibniz on Justice as ‘The Charity of the 
Wise,’” 143–149.
20“Love seeks and finds things to prize and celebrate in the beloved, and regards them as 
good. Even divine love would be the richer rather than the poorer for finding such value in 
the beloved.” Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 165. Cf. ibid., 35–37.
21See Adams, Leibniz, ch. 4 for an analysis of Leibniz’s conception of Ens perfectissimum.
22Perhaps the point that there need not be a strict proportionment is more clearly implied 
in another passage. In the Preface to the Initia scientiae generalis (1679), Leibniz writes: “Nos 
igitur omnes alios pro cujusque perfectione amabimus” (A VI.iv.369; emphasis mine). “Pro” 
can be translated “in proportion,” or “according to,” but it can also be translated “because 
of,” or “on account of.”
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I cited two further texts in the earlier discussion, both of which include 
the assertion that the just person loves the virtuous more than the non-vir-
tuous. On the face of it, these passages suggest that Leibniz does indeed 
endorse the kind of strict proportionment which we are rejecting. But we 
should not be too quick to assume this. First, we must recall that when 
Adams speaks of love being (strictly) proportioned to the excellence of the 
beloved, he clearly has actual excellence in mind. As we have seen, Leibniz 
generally uses “perfection” in this context, rather than “excellence.” Up 
to this point, there has been a tacit assumption that Leibniz is concerned 
only with the actual perfection of the beloved. It is now important to note 
that there are compelling textual grounds to reject this assumption. For 
example, in “Von dem Höchsten Gute” (after 1692) Leibniz clearly uses 
“perfection” both to refer to an actual quality, and also to a capacity to 
attain further perfections. After recalling that perfections are found in God 
“in the highest degree,” Leibniz writes
but the perfection of creatures—and so, our perfection—consists in an unim-
peded, powerful progression to new and new perfections (DS II.36).
In several other writings Leibniz indicates that one who loves is respon-
sive not only to the actual perfection evinced by the beloved, but also to 
their potential for further perfection. For instance, in the Preface to the 
Initia Scientiae generalis (1679), shortly after asserting that we should love 
everyone in proportion to their perfection, he writes:
and we will bear in mind that we can find scarcely anyone so stupid, so 
dishonourable, and so unhappy who is not capable of greater perfection than 
what we ourselves now experience. And generally they will also have some 
actual [perfection] which is lacking in us. (A VI.iv.369; emphasis mine)
In a similar vein, in a dialogue composed between 1679 and 1681, Leibniz 
makes the following observation:
[L]et us remember that true charity includes all human beings, even our 
enemies . . . All those who are wicked are in fact pitiable, and do not deserve 
to be hated. They are human beings, they are made in the image of God . . . 
[and] all capable of the highest perfection. (A VI.iv.2274; emphasis mine)
Finally, in a letter to Madame de Brinon from 1691, Leibniz writes that 
charity should be governed according to “the degrees of perfection which 
can be found or introduced into objects” (A.II.ii.420; emphasis mine).
The point that Leibniz sometimes uses “perfection” in the sense of 
potential perfection naturally provokes the question of whether he holds 
that there are significant differences between individuals’ capacities for 
perfection or virtue (to use the term he sometimes prefers). Given that he 
is no doubt concerned with a fundamental or innate capacity—the kind 
which may well not be manifest in our present condition, but which is 
susceptible to the workings of grace in this life or the next—there is good 
reason for him to accept the claim that no such differences obtain. But if 
that is right, then the claim that the just person loves the virtuous more 
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than the (relatively) non-virtuous appears opaque. Considering the rele-
vant passages in their original context will mitigate the opaqueness and 
put us in a better position to judge whether they constitute evidence that 
Leibniz takes divine love to be strictly proportioned. In each case, the sen-
tences which were not included in my original citation, but which provide 
the relevant context, are italicized:
[O]ne who is wise will love everyone, but the more the traces of divine vir-
tue shine forth in somebody, and the more she hopes [to find] a stronger and more 
willing ally in [working for] the common good . . . the more she will love them 
(A VI.iv.2863).
We cannot love individuals (with whom we are not even acquainted) except insofar 
as we love the whole human race . . . ready and eager when the opportunity should 
arise to bear witness in our very deeds to our excellent disposition [optimam vol-
untatem] towards all, as far as the situation permits. But if the interests [utilitates] 
of very many persons conflict, let us prefer that which is best overall [in summa 
melius], that is, which is fitting [conveniens] for the majority or for those who are 
more distinguished. And other things being equal, the more a person excels 
in perfection of the mind, or in true virtue, the more we will love them (A 
VI.iv.2891).
In both passages it is clear that Leibniz is concerned not with divine love, 
but rather with our love for our fellow human beings.23 More significantly, 
he is indicating that the just person’s love is governed by a desire to opti-
mise the common good. The individuals who are preferred or loved more 
by the just person are those who are best placed to serve this end, and 
they are preferred precisely on this basis.24 But we cannot safely infer from 
these texts that Leibniz holds that God loves some human beings more 
than others. The just human person loves, or favours, a certain individ-
ual more than another because they judge that the former will offer the 
best return on the investment of their attention—i.e., that that individual 
will contribute more to the common good. This judgment is necessarily 
fallible and must largely depend on their apprehension of the actual per-
fection or virtue of the individuals they are considering. God, on the other 
hand, has perfect and infallible knowledge both of the actual perfection 
of any given individual at any point in their life, and also of their capac-
ity for further perfection. Moreover, God’s will to optimise the common 
good must be seen in the context of the divine creative project as a whole: 
Leibniz emphasises the point that God is fundamentally motivated to 
actualise a world which is the best as a whole, with “world” being con-
strued as the whole aggregate of created things.25 God’s furthering of the 
23Given God’s omniscience, the parenthesis in the opening sentence of the second passage 
makes this point clear enough. However, the comment in the first passage about the just 
person hoping to find an ally for the common good naturally suggests that Leibniz is thinking 




common good, i.e., the good of human beings,26 is governed by this more 
fundamental motive. In light of these points of disanalogy between the 
just human person and God, the two texts cited above cannot properly be 
used to argue that on Leibniz’s account, God loves some human beings 
more than others. They therefore do not support the claim that Leibniz is 
committed to the view that divine love is strictly proportioned.
Of course, granting this point does not settle the question of whether 
Leibniz holds that there are quantitative differences in divine love. Given 
that, as Adams persuasively argues, divine love cannot be calibrated in 
such a way that it is impossible to avoid comparing God’s love for indi-
vidual persons in quantitative terms27—it is worth pausing to consider 
this question. I  will seek to establish that Leibniz’s account of human 
excellence (or perfection) gives us good reason to think that he is not com-
mitted to the view that there are such quantitative differences. At the out-
set we should note that, given Leibniz’s insistence that God does not act 
arbitrarily, it seems that any quantitative differences in divine love must 
be explained by the fact that certain human persons are more perfect than 
others. This in turn suggests that perfection is, to cite Adams, “an inten-
sive magnitude that can be completely and consistently ordered on a scale 
of value.”28 Adams rejects this view of perfection. He argues that human 
excellence is not amenable to this kind of quantification because it con-
sists in resemblance to God, and the resemblance is (necessarily) distant, 
fragmentary, and multidimensional.29 Leibniz would no doubt endorse 
the general claim that our excellence or perfection consists in, or at least 
can be characterised as, resemblance to God. What, though, of Adams’s 
further claim that the resemblance is distant, fragmentary, and multidi-
mensional? I will focus on the question of multidimensionality. Recall that 
Leibniz defines perfection as degree of reality, or quantity of essence.30 
“Reality” is best understood in the light of its etymological meaning; it can 
literally be translated “thingishness,” or “thinghood.”31 In this scheme, to 
say that a being attains a greater degree of reality is to say that it becomes 
more fully the kind of thing it is. On the face of it, this suggests that human 
perfection can be ranked according to a mathematical structure of value. 
It is also worth recalling that Leibniz cites knowledge as a paradigm case 
26Leibniz takes it for granted that “the common good” relates only to the good of rational 
creatures. As he never wavers from the view that only rational beings are capable of happi-
ness, he can therefore use “the common good” (or “the public good”) [commune bonum, le 
bien commun; bonum publicum, le bien public] interchangeably with “the common happiness” 
[communis felicitas, bonheur commun] Cf. A VI.iv.2810 and A IV.iv.614.
27See Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 168–175.
28Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 117. Adams is speaking of excellence rather than 
perfection.
29Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 117.
30E.g., GP VII.303; A VI.iv.1358.
31See Adams, “The Priority of the Perfect in the Philosophical Theology of the Continental 
Rationalists,” 102–103.
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of perfection,32 and that some of his writings clearly indicate that this par-
ticular perfection is uniquely conducive to Amor Dei super omnia, which 
he takes to represent our greatest overall perfection. Often in these con-
texts, “knowledge” refers specifically to knowledge of those eternal or 
necessary truths which allow us to understand the workings of nature. 
As Leibniz implicitly acknowledges, human persons can excel each other 
with regard to this kind of knowledge.33 But he is at pains to emphasize 
that the “simple” are not excluded from Amor Dei super omnia, thanks to 
God’s gift of revelation and of the Holy Spirit.34 We must also remember 
that Leibniz never suggests that knowledge is the only perfection instan-
tiated by human beings. Furthermore, it seems clear that the other per-
fections cannot be reduced to knowledge. As we have seen, in Leibniz’s 
writings relating to love, “perfection” is sometimes used interchangeably 
with “virtue,” and it is clear that the virtues in question do not all depend 
on relatively advanced cognitive abilities.35 Given his assumption that 
there is a wide range of virtues, or perfections, his implication that these 
are irreducibly plural, and his assertions that divine love is responsive 
both to actual and to potential perfection, Leibniz must surely accept that 
human perfection is multidimensional. It thus seems that on his account, 
human perfection resists ranking on a scale of value. This in turn suggests 
that he is not committed to the view that there are quantitative differences 
in divine love.36
One further consideration merits our attention. Leibniz emphasises that 
rational creatures have the unique privilege of being able to enter into a 
society with God—i.e., to be members of the City of God37—because their 
very rationality makes them “little Gods” [petits Dieux], whose perfections 
differ from God’s only in degree.38 Yet the difference between creaturely 
perfections and divine perfections is nothing less than the difference 
between the finite and the infinite: human beings can thus be said to fall 
infinitely short of the divine perfection.39 In an interesting passage from a 
text written between 1701 and 1706, Leibniz draws an analogy between 
32E.g., Preface to the Theodicy (H 51/ GP VI.270, DM 1/ AG 35).
33Cf. A IV.vi.363; A IV.i.532.
34See A IV.vi.757–758. Cf. RB 497.
35This is particularly clear in “De imaginatione futurae vitae” (before 1698), where Leibniz 
describes a “humble Japanese woman” [mulierculam Japonensem] whose constancy surpasses 
that of “the most profound European Doctor of Theology.” A IV.vii.662–3.
36In the Confessio philosophi Leibniz speaks of some human persons being loved less by 
God than others (CP 31); I am disregarding this passage as Leibniz is not speaking in his own 
voice but, rather, is considering a Calvinist view.
37Leibniz’s use of the term “City of God” diverges significantly from Augustine’s. See 
Rudolph, ‘“Je suis du sentiment de S. Augustin,’” 65–69.
38Letter to Arnauld, 1687, A II.ii2.257.
39“Conversation du Marquis de Pianese et du Père Emery Eremite (1679–81?)”: “l’esprit 
de l’homme est un petit modelle de Dieu, quoyqu’infiniment au dessous de sa perfection.” 
(A VI.iv.2269)
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creatures and infinitesimals, acknowledging that in some sense, the value 
of any creature is negligible:
[I]n a certain way, the creature can be regarded as nothing [pro nihilo] when 
compared to God, as the addition and subtraction of infinitely small quanti-
ties to or from ordinal numbers in infinitesimal calculus is disregarded [neg-
ligitur]. (A IV.ix.627)
This analogy suggests that if God’s love for individual human beings 
were strictly proportioned to their perfection, it would be meagre indeed. 
As such, it provides further support for the claim that Leibniz cannot hold 
that divine love is strictly proportioned to our perfection. For this reason, 
and in light of the other considerations I have discussed, I take it that his 
account is consistent with the view that divine love is gracious, even if 
Leibniz himself does not explicitly acknowledge this.
III. Is God Cruel?
For Leibniz, God’s most fundamental motive in creating is to maximize har-
mony—i.e., to actualize a world which is the most harmonious as a whole. 
The existence of any human person is explained by their being part of the 
best possible world, a fully determined series of things which is the only 
possible world to which that individual can belong. Yet Leibniz is also com-
mitted to defending the doctrine of eternal damnation. These various com-
mitments leave him vulnerable to the charge that he presents us with a God 
who is cruel—and hence unloving. Leibniz is well aware of this vulnera-
bility. Indeed, the charge is given poignant expression in the Confessio phi-
losophi, when the Theologian gives voice to the “complaint of the damned”:
[T]hat [complaint] of the damned presents itself to us, which cannot be 
ignored . . . [They complain] that they were born in such a way, were sent 
into the world in such a way, came upon [such] times, persons, [and] occa-
sions, that they could not but perish . . .
How cruel it is for the father who brought about their misery—[the father] 
who caused an unfortunate birth, who provided the worst upbringing—to 
gaze on [their misery] unmoved, [and] for him even to will their punish-
ment, when it is he himself who should be punished. They shall curse the 
order of things, apt for their destruction; God who is happy at the misery 
of others; themselves because they cannot be annihilated; the series of the 
universe, which also involved them; and finally [they shall curse] that very 
eternal and immutable possibility of the ideas, the primary source of their 
misfortunes, which determines the universal harmony and the existence 
of things in it, and accordingly breaks out, from among so many possible 
[states], into none other than the state of the universe in which their misery 
is contained, so that the happiness of others may be more conspicuous (CP 
77–79; translation modified40).
40The most significant modification I have made to Sleigh’s translation relates to querimo-
nia damnatorum, which Sleigh renders “lament of the damned.” Although “lament” conveys 
the poignancy of the predicament of the damned, it does not capture the juridical sense of 
querimonia, and I take it that Leibniz uses this term precisely because of its juridical associa-
tions. For this reason, “complaint” seems preferable to me.
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God “sends” certain individuals into a world which includes circumstances 
which will determine them to succumb to mortal sin; their unending misery 
is exacerbated by the knowledge that they cannot be annihilated, because 
their existence augments the overall harmony of the world by making “the 
happiness of others . . . more conspicuous.”41 Little wonder that God’s deal-
ings with them provoke the response: “How cruel!” [Quam crudele]. In the 
person of the interlocutor, Leibniz gives short shrift to the complaint of the 
damned: “That is rather dramatic, but it is not equally justified” (CP 79; 
translation modified). In the remainder of the dialogue, he seeks to rebut the 
complaint by arguing that freedom of the will is compatible with determin-
ism: the damned cannot coherently complain about their fate because they 
have brought it upon themselves by freely willing to commit mortal sin.42
But, of course, it is not sufficient for Leibniz simply to establish that the 
damned freely will their fate; given his definition of justus, he must also 
show that God loves the damned, and thus wills their good. How, though, 
can God be said to will the good of the damned in any robust sense? It 
will be helpful to frame this problem in the context of a more general one, 
namely the problem of how anyone can be damned, if, as the Scriptures 
assert, “God wills that all human beings be saved” (1 Timothy 2:4). In the 
Summa theologiae Aquinas proposes a solution which draws on the distinc-
tion between antecedent and consequent willing—a distinction which is 
employed by St John of Damascus (c. 675–749). The relevant passage from 
the Summa theologiae is as follows:
[E]ach thing, insofar as it is good, is to that extent willed by God. At first 
sight, considered in itself, something can be good or evil but it can none-
theless be the contrary insofar as it is considered alongside its attendant cir-
cumstances .  .  . Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he 
wills all men to live; but he consequently wills a murderer to be hanged. 
Similarly, God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills 
some to be damned, in accordance with the demands of his justice . . . This 
can be called a velleity rather than an absolute will. In this way it is clear 
that whatever God wills simpliciter comes about, even if that which he wills 
antecedently does not come about.43
Leibniz cites this discussion in one of the appendices to the Theodicy (1710). 
He writes:
We generally have reason to say that the antecedent will of God tends 
towards the production of good and the prevention of evil, as a part and 
41The view that there is an aesthetic rationale for God’s punishment of sin—i.e., that such 
punishment is permitted because it increases the overall harmony of the world—can be 
traced back to Augustine. See Adams, “Justice, Happiness, and Perfection in Leibniz’s City 
of God,” 207n60. Leibniz takes it for granted that the annihilation of the damned is not an 
absolute impossibility; he simply holds that it is inconsistent with divine wisdom.
42Indeed, Leibniz holds that the damned are not deprived of their freedom of will after 
death; they perpetuate their damnation by perpetuating their sin. See Strickland, “Leibniz 
on Eternal Punishment,” 310.
43Summa theologiae Ia, 19, 6, ad 1.
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under a certain aspect (particulariter et secundum quid: Thom., I, qu. 19, art. 6), 
according to the measure of the degree of each good or of each evil. But the 
consequent—or final and total—divine will tends towards the production of 
as many goods as can be established together, whose combination thereby 
becomes determined, and also involves the permission of some evils and the 
exclusion of some goods, as the best possible plan of the universe demands 
(H 383/ GP VI.382; translation modified).
Leibniz uses “antecedent will” in just the way Aquinas does: he takes it 
that the antecedent will tends towards any good qua good. His use of 
“consequent will” is not so clearly aligned with Aquinas’s, though it is 
not obviously inconsistent with it. The consequent will, Leibniz suggests, 
tends towards the obtaining of the greatest overall good—i.e., the actual-
isation of the best possible world.44
In the closing sentences of the passage from the Summa theologiae cited 
above, Aquinas makes two important claims. First, he asserts that the 
antecedent will can be described as a velleity, i.e., (to cite a later section 
of the Summa) that which someone would will [vellet] “if something else 
did not get in the way.”45 Second, he asserts that whatever is willed conse-
quently by God comes about. In §24 of the Causa Dei Leibniz indicates that 
he accepts the second of these claims: he clearly (if implicitly) endorses 
Aquinas’s view that in the case of God, the consequent will “always 
obtains its effect.” (Tcd 24/MS 119). But in the next section of the Causa 
Dei he rejects the view that the antecedent will is merely a kind of velleity:
§25. The antecedent will is entirely serious and pure, [and] must not be con-
fused with a velleity (i.e., when someone would will if they were able, and 
would wish to be able) which is not found in God. (GP VI.442/ MS 119. 
Translation modified; emphasis mine)
In the Theodicy this point is explicitly related to the question of salvation 
and damnation:
[I]t may be said that God tends to all good, as good . . . and that by an anteced-
ent will. He has a serious inclination to sanctify and to save all human beings, 
to exclude sin, and to prevent damnation. It may even be said that this will is 
efficacious of itself (per se), that is, of such a kind that the effect would ensue if 
there were not some stronger reason to prevent it . . . Complete and infallible 
success belongs only to the consequent will, as it is called . . . This consequent 
will, final and decisive, results from the conflict of all the antecedent wills . . . 
it is from the concurrence of all these particular wills that the total will arises. 
So in mechanics compound movement results from all the tendencies which 
concur in one and the same moving body, and satisfies each one equally, in 
so far as it is possible to do all at one time . . . In this sense also it may be said 
that the antecedent will is efficacious in some way, and even successfully takes 
effect [et même effective avec succès] (T 22/ GP VI.116/ H 136–137)46
44Cf. T 23 (GP VI.116/ H 137).
45Summa theologiae III, 21, 4, resp.
46This passage is discussed in Rateau, La question du mal chez Leibniz, 542–544.
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When thinking about the antecedent will, Leibniz suggests, we must be 
careful to distinguish “not obtaining its full effect” from “being com-
pletely nullified.” Just as the failure of a particular tendency in a moving 
body to fully determine the final movement of that body does not entail 
that that tendency has been completely nullified, so too the antecedent 
will’s failing to obtain its full effect does not entail that it is completely 
nullified. Far from being a mere velleity, then, the antecedent will is not 
without efficacy, and thus can be described as “serious.”
To the best of my knowledge, Leibniz never appeals to the claim that 
God antecedently wills the salvation of all to support his claim that 
God loves everyone. Yet such a move is surely open to him. As I have 
already noted, Leibniz’s preferred definition of love should not be taken 
merely at face value; “Delighting in the happiness of another” need 
not involve an occurrent delight but, rather, can properly be construed 
as willing that person’s good or happiness. Leibniz could thus argue 
that God loves the damned because He antecedently—and hence, seri-
ously—wills their happiness. Though coherent, I  struggle to see how 
this solution is consistent with the view that God loves all in a robust 
sense of the term.47 Furthermore, it does little to dispel worries that 
God treats the damned cruelly, willing their overwhelmingly miserable 
existence because it is a necessary condition of the actualization of the 
best possible world.
There is good reason to think that Leibniz himself is disturbed by the 
doctrine of eternal damnation, for broadly the reasons I have just outlined. 
Indeed, the very inclusion of the “Complaint of the damned” in the Confessio 
philosophi, as well as its rhetorical force,48 can be taken to suggest this. 
A much later text—the Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken über eine Schrift genandt 
Kurtze Vorstellung of 169949—is interesting in this connection. Although 
the Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken was co-authored with the Lutheran abbot 
Gerhard Wolter Molanus, it seems clearly to have been written mainly by 
Leibniz.50 In the section of the Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken dealing with pre-
destination we find the concession that some people are “horrified” by the 
thought that God brought human beings into existence even though He 
foresaw that Adam and Eve would sin; that their sin would be imputed 
to all their descendants; that the punishment for this sin would include 
“unspeakable pain in the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and 
his angels (Matthew 25:41)”; and that notwithstanding the atonement 
47I struggle to see this primarily because I find Marilyn Adams’s account of divine love 
persuasive. See M. Adams, “The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians.”
48See Sleigh’s comment in CP 160n89.
49The “Kurtze Vorstellung,” composed by Daniel Jablonksi, was a summary of points of 
agreement and disagreement between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. For the back-
ground to the Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken, see Claire Rösler-Le Van’s discussion in NI 895–898, 
and Adams’s review of her edition in The Leibniz Review. The Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken is 
printed in the original German in A IV.vii, and there is a translation into French in NI.
50See Rösler-Le Van’s comments in NI: 902–903.
177LEIBNIZ ON DIVINE LOVE
made by Christ, most people (and, indeed, most Christians) would endure 
eternal misery.51 This summary prompts the following comment:
[I]ndeed we cannot understand how, humanly speaking, God—whose 
heartfelt mercy [hertzliche Barmherzigkeit] shines through not only from 
the light of nature, but is also extolled in Luke 1.7852—could override his 
merciful, paternal heart and bring Himself to create such a poor and mis-
erable creature as a human being became after their deplorable fall. (A. 
IV.vii.478)
This is immediately followed by the observation that a common response 
to this problem is to appeal to human free will, and to God’s gift of grace. 
Recognising the “correctness” of such a response, the authors nonetheless 
deem it insufficient, as it neglects the question of the fundamental “cause 
of the difficulty”—namely, “Why, in the final analysis, God willed to cre-
ate such miserable creatures, since He could have been relieved of them” 
(A IV.vii.478). Francis Bacon’s approach to this problem (in the Confession 
of Faith) is then criticised on the basis that he fails to explain why it would 
not have been better for human beings to remain “uncreated,” “in noth-
ingness,” or at least returned to nothingness after being created, rather 
than for so many creatures to be brought into existence to endure an eter-
nity of suffering.53 The account of damnation reported in this section of the 
Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken diverges significantly from Leibniz’s own—not 
least because the former draws on the biblical tradition of representing 
hell as an “eternal fire,” and assumes that most people will be damned.54 
But the fundamental difficulty is one which Leibniz also faces: he too 
must explain how God’s permitting eternal misery is consistent with His 
“heartfelt mercy” and His “paternal heart,” i.e., with His love, as that is 
characterised in the Scriptures.
One way in which Leibniz seeks to alleviate this difficulty is to endorse 
the view that the pains of the damned could be mitigated. His most 
striking discussion of this point comes in the De arcanis sublimium vel de 
summa rerum of 1676. This piece is part of a collection of drafts which were 
intended to form the basis of a projected work on metaphysics. As G. H. 
R. Parkinson notes, two themes figure prominently in these writings: the 
nature of the infinite and the question of the supreme being and His rela-
tion to the world.55 Both themes are evident in the following paragraph of 
51See A IV.vii.477–479.
52The relevant phrase in the Luther Bible is rendered “die herzliche Barmherzigkeit 
unsers Gottes.” The Vulgate has “per viscera misericordiae Dei nostri.”
53See A IV.vii.479.
54In Leibniz’s own depictions of damnation, he does not suggest that the damned are cast 
into a fiery pit. Instead he emphasises the point that their misery is the natural result of their 
sin. See Strickland, “Leibniz on Eternal Punishment,” 315. Similarly, Leibniz never endorses 
the view that the majority of human beings will be damned.
55See Parkinson, “Leibniz’s De Summa Rerum.”
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the De arcanis sublimium, where Leibniz makes an intriguing suggestion 
about damnation:
The maximally harmonious [harmonicum maxime] is what is most pleasing 
to the most perfect mind. If God is a mind and a person, then it follows that 
there ought to hold, in respect of God and of other minds, whatever can 
be demonstrated of the best republic, whose king is most wise and most 
powerful.
[. . .] It does not seem to me that eternal damnation is inconsistent with the 
harmony of things. It could be that damnation is of infinite duration but not 
unbounded [infinitae durationis non tamen interminatae]. (A VI.iii.476)
The suggestion that damnation could be “of infinite duration but not 
unbounded” is undoubtedly arresting, if also opaque and undeveloped.56 
Any serious attempt to make sense of it would no doubt require a sus-
tained engagement with Leibniz’s metaphysics of space and time—and 
particularly his discussions of the nature of the infinite. I will not attempt 
such a study here,57 but will offer some brief remarks. First, it is worth 
recalling the immediate context of the suggestion that damnation could 
be of infinite duration but not unbounded. As we have seen, at the start 
of the paragraph in which it appears, Leibniz asserts that “the maximally 
harmonious is what is most pleasing to the most perfect mind.” He then 
clearly implies that it follows from this that the republic made up of God 
and other minds must be the best. In subsequently turning to damnation, 
Leibniz is no doubt tacitly acknowledging that God’s permitting eternal 
misery gives us reason to doubt that the republic of minds (or City of God) 
is the best. Given that Leibniz’s commitment to the claim that ours is the 
best possible world is a cornerstone of his theodicy, and that he takes this 
claim to entail that the City of God is the most perfect republic, it is not 
surprising that he seeks to rebut the objection that “damnation is incon-
sistent with the harmony of things.”
His rebuttal hinges on a distinction between the infinite and the 
unbounded. The latter term is defined in another piece dating from 
Leibniz’s Paris period: “I call the unbounded [interminatum] that in which 
no ultimate point can be posited” (A VII.vi.549). As for “the infinite,” 
shortly before the discussion in the De arcanis sublimium cited above, 
Leibniz notes that in one sense of the term, “the infinite” is more correctly 
termed “immensum.”58 Ohad Nachtomy’s comments on Leibniz’s use of 
immensum in another piece from this period are illuminating:
[U]nlike the current English connotations of the word ‘immense,’ Leibniz 
does not use immensum here to indicate a large or immense magnitude; 
56These latter features become less puzzling once we recall that these papers were largely 
intended only for Leibniz’s personal use.
57See Futch, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Time and Space; Nachtomy, “Leibniz’s Early Encounters 
with Descartes, Galileo, and Spinoza on Infinity,” and Arthur’s introduction and commen-
tary in LC.
58“Rectius hoc infinitum appellaretur Immensum” (A VI.iii.475).
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rather, he uses it in a way much closer to its literal meaning in Latin, that is, 
to indicate something beyond any measure, or more precisely, something that 
has no measure (and is therefore impossible to measure)—something that 
cannot be measured because it does not belong to the category of quantity.59
We can therefore construe Leibniz’s suggestion that damnation could be 
“of infinite duration but not unbounded” as follows: “It could be that dam-
nation is of immeasurable duration, and nonetheless has an ultimate point 
(or end).” Leibniz soon returns to this theme in the De arcanis sublimium:
[A]ll happiness is unbounded [interminatam]. No misery is unbounded, but 
it could be an eternity [aeternitatem]. Therefore the blessed will be happy 
longer than the damned will be unhappy. (A VI.iii.476)
The context of these remarks—i.e., their being in a paragraph which opens 
with the assertion that the City of God is the “best republic”—suggests that 
the claim that no misery is unbounded can be inferred precisely from the 
claim that the City of God is the best republic. The subsequent assertion 
that “the blessed will be happy longer than the damned will be unhappy” 
appears to confirm the earlier suggestion that the misery involved in dam-
nation will come to an end.
If this interpretation is correct, Leibniz would clearly be proposing a 
radically new conception of damnation. Needless to say, it is scarcely sur-
prising that these remarks are confined to a piece which was not intended 
for publication (at least in its present form). To the best of my knowl-
edge, the account of damnation outlined here does not feature in any of 
Leibniz’s other writings. Nonetheless, a discussion in the Theodicy on the 
mitigation of the pains of the damned is worth citing in this connection. 
Immediately after noting that “Origen made use of . . . Psalm 77:10:60 ‘God 
will not forget to have pity, and will not suppress all his mercy in his 
anger,’ ” Leibniz writes:
Augustine responds (Enchirid. c.112) that it could be that the punishment 
of the damned lasts eternally, and that it is nevertheless mitigated. If the 
text suggested that, the diminution would go on to infinity in relation to its 
duration, and nonetheless it would have a non plus ultra in relation to the 
magnitude [grandeur] of the diminution, just as there are asymptotic figures 
in geometry, where an infinite length makes only a finite space. (T 272/ GP 
VI.279/ H 294; translation modified)
Clearly, this suggestion is less bold than the one presented in De arcanis 
sublimium. Still, when we compare this passage to the chapter of the 
59Nachtomy, “Leibniz’s Early Encounters with Descartes, Galileo, and Spinoza on 
Infinity,” 147–148.
60Although the reference is to verse 10 of Psalm 77, the line Leibniz cites is verse 9 in the 
Luther Bible and in modern translations. Perhaps the discrepancy can be explained by the 
fact that in the Vulgate, the line in question is verse 10 (though the number of the psalm itself 
is 76, in keeping with the numbering system used there).
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Enchiridion which it cites, we can see that it is striking enough. The rele-
vant passages from the Enchiridion are these:
It is in vain, therefore, that some . . . deplore the eternal punishment of the 
damned, and unceasing and everlasting torments, and they do not believe 
such things will be . . . ‘God will not forget,’ they say, ‘to show mercy, nor in 
his anger will he shut up his mercy.’ This is indeed the text of a holy psalm. 
But without the least doubt this is to be understood of those persons who are 
called ‘vessels of mercy’ . . .
But let [those who are disturbed by the doctrine of eternal damnation] 
believe, if they care to, that the torments of the damned are to some extent 
mitigated at certain intervals. Even so, the wrath of God . . . can still be under-
stood to rest upon them. Thus, even in His wrath . . . He would not withhold 
His mercies; yet, not so as to put an end to their eternal punishment, but 
rather to apply or to interpose some little respite from their torments.61
All Augustine is prepared to grant is that Psalm 77:9 gives us grounds 
to think that the damned enjoy limited and temporary respite from their 
torment. In contrast, Leibniz’s appeal in the Theodicy to a certain kind of 
asymptote suggests respite which is permanent (though also limited).
Leibniz’s suggestion that damnation could be of limited duration 
clearly takes the sting out of the charge that God is cruel to the damned; 
to a lesser extent, so does his creative appropriation of the view that the 
pains of the damned are mitigated. In this way, Leibniz has the resources 
to rebut the objection that in his scheme, God treats some persons cruelly, 
and thus cannot be said to love all.
IV. Concluding Remarks
I have sought to defend Leibniz’s account of divine love against two objec-
tions. Regarding the first, I have argued that the proportionment thesis is 
problematic only if the proportionment in question is strict. If it is not—
i.e., if the thesis is simply that there are proper grounds for God’s love 
for human beings—then it is consistent with the view that divine love is 
gracious. As far as I can see, Leibniz never explicitly indicates that God’s 
love for us is strictly proportioned to our perfection. Furthermore, given 
that he sometimes uses “perfection” in the sense of “potential perfection,” 
and that he accepts that there is an irreducible plurality of perfections, or 
virtues, he appears to be committed to the view that human perfection is 
multidimensional, and thus resists rank ordering. This in turn suggests 
that on Leibniz’s account there are not the kind of quantitative differences 
in divine love which would give us reason to doubt its graciousness. 
Finally, despite Leibniz’s striking emphasis on the affinity between God 
and rational creatures, he explicitly acknowledges that our perfection falls 
infinitely short of the divine perfection. For these reasons, I  take it that 
Leibniz does not hold that divine love is strictly proportioned, and thus 
can allow that it is gracious.
61Enchiridion §112 (ch. 29). Translation slightly modified.
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As for the second objection: Leibniz himself is no doubt aware that his 
allegiance to the doctrine of eternal damnation comes at the cost of expos-
ing him to the charge that God is cruel (and hence unloving). This worry 
is dismissed rather too briskly in the Confessio philosophi, even if that early 
dialogue also has the merit of presenting the “complaint of the damned” 
in a form which is both cogent and poignant. But the charge of divine cru-
elty can be rebutted—or at least blunted—if we turn to Leibniz’s treatment 
of damnation in some later writings, notably the De arcanis sublimium and 
the Theodicy.
In defending Leibniz against these two objections I do not mean to give 
an unqualified endorsement of his account of divine love. Nor do I wish 
to claim that Leibniz does enough to pre-empt the objections I have dis-
cussed. Indeed, I am sympathetic to the view that it is regrettable that he 
never makes the graciousness of divine love explicit, or publicly repudi-
ates the doctrine of eternal damnation. But I wish to conclude by suggest-
ing that we should not be too quick to condemn him for these failings, 
because they should be seen in the light of his commitment to promoting 
Amor Dei super omnia. This commitment is explicitly acknowledged in a 
letter to Philip Spener from 1687, when he writes:
I should venture to assert that .  .  . although I am occupied with different 
things, nonetheless as far as possible I bring all [these] things back to this: 
that true knowledge of God and reverence for him are advanced [promovean-
tur]. (A II.ii.211)
It may be tempting to dismiss this as a pious platitude, but there is good 
reason to take Leibniz at his word. His sincerity is most obvious in his 
uncharacteristically bold stance vis-à-vis the view that pagans are neces-
sarily damned: his rejection of that view is clearly motivated by a concern 
not to undermine love for God.62
A cornerstone of Leibniz’s project of promoting Amor Dei super omnia is 
his vehement opposition to any suggestion that God acts arbitrarily. Instead, 
he insists, God’s actions are always governed by His perfect wisdom, which 
in turn is a function of God’s perfect knowledge of necessary truths. No 
doubt any explicit acknowledgement of the role of grace in divine love risks 
implying a certain arbitrariness; Leibniz’s sensitivity to this risk offers a 
plausible explanation for his reluctance to offer such an acknowledgement. 
To this extent, his reticence is an expression of his commitment to promoting 
Amor Dei super omnia. The same can be said of Leibniz’s failure to repudiate 
the doctrine of eternal damnation. In a letter to Lorenz Hertel from January 
1695, he makes the following remarks about universal salvation:
All that can be said about it is that it would be true if it were possible, and 
if divine justice could allow it. But as we do not know the depths of [divine 
justice], it is safer not to advance opinions which are not soundly established 
62See A II.ii.340. Re. the boldness of Leibniz’s resistance to the view that pagans are neces-
sarily damned, see Adams, “Leibniz’s Conception of Religion,” 61–63.
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and can be harmful since they are capable of keeping sinners in their secu-
rity.63 (A I.xi.21)
Here Leibniz clearly implies that promulgation of the doctrine of eternal 
damnation is justified on the grounds that it discourages sin. Given that 
sin is an impediment to Amor Dei super omnia, to endorse the doctrine of 
eternal damnation is to support Amor Dei super omnia. Leibniz may well be 
mistaken about the practical benefits of the doctrine of eternal damnation, 
but I  am concerned here only with his motivation, and that is implied 
clearly enough in the passage cited above. Given this motivation, it seems 
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